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THE JUDICIAL REVIEW CASELOAD 
Abstract 
The Scottish application of judicial review procedure was introduced in 1985, some seven 
years after a similar but not identical procedure was introduced in England and Wales. An 
examination of the use made of the procedure since its introduction reveals some similarities 
but also differences between Scotland and England and Wales. This article examines possible 
reasons for the differences, and asks whether or not they matter, before concluding that there 
is a need for a more detailed study of judicial review in Scotland as the procedure enters its 
fourth decade.  
Introduction 
In matters of public law Scots law has tended to follow the example of English law. So it was 
with the application for judicial review procedure introduced in 1985, following Lord 
Fraser’s remarks in Brown v Hamilton District Council,1 which was modelled on but not in 
all respects identical to the application for judicial review procedure introduced in England 
and Wales some seven years earlier; that it was not identical seems attributable to the method 
by which it was introduced rather than any desire that it be different.2 The 30th anniversary 
invites consideration of the use made of the procedure since its introduction. Has there been 
an increase in the frequency of recourse to judicial review, bearing in mind that the Court of 
Session’s supervisory jurisdiction was essentially moribund before the new procedure was 
introduced?3 If there has been an increase, who is it being used by, against whom, in respect 
of what and with what results? Has the pattern of use remained constant over the period, or 
has it changed, and if so in what respects? How does the use made of the procedure compare 
with the use made of the English application for judicial review procedure? Is it essentially 
the same or different and, if so, in what respects? And, if there are differences, are these 
simply to be expected or are they matters about which we should be at all concerned? 
Answering these questions is a less straightforward matter than might be assumed. Until 
recently comprehensive statistics were lacking, and indeed were not always published 
because of a presumed lack of interest. With the aid of two earlier snapshots, however, we are 
able to build up a reasonably full picture of the use made of the procedure over the last 30 
years, but not it should be said at the outset of the success or otherwise of applications 
throughout that period.  
1 1983 SC (HL) 1, 45. 
2 It was introduced by Act of Sederunt (Rules of Court Amendment No 2) (Judicial Review) 1985 (SI 1985 
/500) i.e. rules of procedure made by the Court of Session itself, which precluded any change to the substantive 
law of judicial review; if further change was sought legislation would have been required.  
3 A Scottish Law Commission memorandum commented that “the volume of case law in this field between 1960 
and 1970 does not afford evidence of an increase in judicial scrutiny of governmental matters like that 
experienced in England during the same period”: Remedies in Administrative Law (Scottish Law Commission 
No 14, 1971) para 4.4. The same memorandum added (para 4.3) that “[m]erely because Scots law is free of 
many of the irksome procedural difficulties which are such a marked feature of English administrative law, it 
does not necessarily follow that Scots law would not benefit from the introduction of a flexible petition for 
review of official acts and omissions… even though the particular advantages of such a remedy would be 
different as between England and Scotland.” 
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The early years  
The first snapshot is provided by combining two academic studies carried out during the early 
years of the new procedure. The first, by Page and Deans, was an ESRC funded study of the 
77 petitions disposed of, or not proceeded with, during the first two years of operation of the 
procedure,  i.e., between 30 April 1985 and 29 April 1987.4 The second, by Mullen, Pick and 
Prosser, was a Leverhulme Trust funded study of all judicial review proceedings raised in the 
six years between 1988 and 1993.5   
The first study showed the number of petitions increasing from 49 in 1986, the first full year 
of operation of the procedure, to 88 in 1989, with housing being the most prolific source of 
petitions, which was unsurprising given that it was the unsatisfactory consequences of Scots 
law’s reliance on the ordinary remedies in respect of the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 
1977 that had led to the introduction of the new procedure. The next most important source 
was planning, followed by education, licensing and welfare. The remaining petitions were of 
a miscellaneous nature. There was only one immigration petition in the three years covered 
by the study. 
The second study showed the number of applications continuing to rise, from 86 (rather than 
88) in 1989, the year the first study had left it, to 151 in 1993, with immigration and housing / 
homelessness petitions accounting for the bulk of the increase in the last two years of the 
period.6 Immigration, licensing and housing were in fact the most common sources of 
petitions over the six years covered by the study.7  
Table 1: Number of judicial review petitions 1985-1993 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
27 49 44 66 86 (88) 62 78 117 151 
 
Source: Page and Deans, Mullen et al, Table 3.1 
In summary, there was a threefold increase over the first eight full years of the new procedure 
(1986-1993), with the bulk of that increase coming from immigration cases: after a slow start 
in which there was only one petition in the first three years, immigration accounted for more 
than a third of all petitions in 1993. The next most important sources were licensing, housing 
and planning. The following table from the second study provides a fuller breakdown of the 
subject matter of petitions over the six years covered by the study.  
 
 
                                                          
4 Alan Page, ‘Judicial Review in the Court of Session’ in Socio-Legal Research in the Scottish Courts, Volume 2 
(Scottish Office, Central Research Unit, 1987) 
5 Tom Mullen, Katy Pick and Tony Prosser, Judicial Review in Scotland (Chichester: John Wiley &Sons, 1996) 
6 Mullen et al (n 5) 18-19. 
7 Mullen et al (n 5) 21. 
3 
 
Table 2: Subject matter of petitions 1988-1993 
Subject  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1988-93 
Education 8 3 0 4 2 9 26 
 12.1% 3.5% 0.0% 5.1% 1.7% 6.0% 4.6% 
Employment 2 2 5 0 2 1 12 
 3.0% 2.3% 8.1% 0.0% 1.7% 0.7% 2.1% 
Housing  8 10 9 10 26 26 89 
 12.1% 11.6% 14.5% 12.8% 22.2% 17.2% 15.9% 
Immigration 15 21 12 17 36 55 156 
 22.7% 24.4% 19.4% 21.8% 30.8% 36.4% 27.9% 
Legal aid 2 0 1 2 1 3 9 
 3.0% 0.0% 1.6% 2.6% 0.9% 2.0% 1.6% 
Licensing 8 28 7 13 11 25 92 
 12.1% 32.6% 11.3% 16.7% 9.4% 16.6% 16.4% 
Local gov 4 1 5 3 8 9 30 
 6.1% 1.2% 8.1% 3.8% 6.8% 6.0% 5.4% 
Planning 8 7 10 8 8 5 46 
 12.1% 8.1% 16.1% 10.3% 6.8% 3.3% 8.2% 
Prisons 1 0 3 2 0 1 7 
 1.5% 0.0% 4.8% 2.6% 0.0% 0.7% 1.3% 
Social Sec 1 1 2 8 3 6 21 
 1.5% 1.2% 3.2% 10.3% 2.6% 4.0% 3.8% 
Taxes 0 1 0 2 0 1 4 
 0.0% 1.2% 0.0% 2.6% 0.0% 0.7% 0.7% 
Transport 0 2 0 4 3 0 9 
 0.0% 2.3% 0.0% 5.1% 2.6% 0.0% 1.6% 
Welfare  4 3 3 2 4 2 18 
 6.1% 3.5% 4.8% 2.6% 3.4% 1.3% 3.2% 
Other 5 7 5 3 13 8 41 
 7.6% 8.1% 8.1% 3.8% 11.1% 5.3% 7.3% 
Total 66 86 62 78 117 151 560 
 
Source: Mullen et al, Table 3.2.  
Graph 1 shows the total number of applications over the nine years covered by the two 
studies, with the number of immigration applications shown separately. 
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The two studies also revealed that most petitions were raised by individuals or companies; 
that most were raised against local government rather than central government, but that this 
was changing with the increasing number of immigration petitions; and also that most were 
unsuccessful. Of the 77 petitions disposed of by the time the first study was concluded, only 
14 (18.2 per cent) were granted at first instance, which number fell to 13 (16.9 per cent) once 
appeals /reclaiming motions had been taken into account. The study did, however, identify a 
further 20 (26 per cent) petitions in which some sort of accommodation was reached between 
the parties, or an undertaking given to the court on the basis of which the petition could be 
concluded, and which could not therefore regarded as completely unsuccessful. The second 
study found that the success rate continued to be low, while recognising like the first study 
that success was not simply a matter of whether or not a petition was granted.8  
Both studies saw the new procedure as having been a success. The most striking feature of 
the procedure that emerged from the first study was its speed, with many petitions being 
disposed of within two months of being raised,9 which as well as being advantageous to 
petitioners partly accounted for its largely favourable reception among respondent authorities. 
Insofar as one of the main objectives of reform had been to expedite judicial review 
proceedings the evidence suggested that it had been successful. The second study  - whose 
conclusions were acknowledged by its authors to be “perhaps, unusually positive for 
academic research”10 - found that the procedure had provided a “relatively rapid and 
accessible” means of challenging the legality of administrative decision-making, while at the 
same time avoiding the problems of classification that had arisen in England and Wales 
following the House of Lords’ insistence in O’Reilly v Mackman 11 that the application for 
judicial review procedure must be used in England and Wales where a challenge was based 
                                                          
8 Mullen et al (n 5) 29. 
9 Of the 77 petitions examined, 63 proceeded to a final interlocutor with the period covered by the study. Of 
these 63, 16 (25 per cent) were disposed of within four weeks, 31 (49 per cent) with six weeks and 43 (68 per 
cent within two months of being raised. Only two were not disposed of within six months.  
10 Mullen et al (n 5) 136. 
11 O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 21 AC 237 
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on rights entitled to protection under public law. The study found no evidence of the Court of 
Session being seriously overloaded as a result of a large number of weak petitions being 
raised. If there was problem, its authors argued, it was one of the underuse rather than 
overuse of the procedure given the relatively narrow range of subject matter in the majority 
of petitions examined, and the limited number of solicitors initiating judicial review cases.12  
The Scottish Civil Courts Review 
The second snapshot is provided by the Scottish Civil Courts Review (the ‘Gill Review’).13 
Table 3: Judicial review petitions 2000-2006 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2000-
06 
Immigration 45 68 68 99 95 74 101 550 
 31.7% 32.7% 42.5% 56.9% 36.4% 32.3% 43.7% 39.1% 
Misc. 55 76 61 45 39 57 59 392 
 38.8% 36.5% 38.1% 25.9% 14.9% 24.9% 25.5% 27.9% 
Prisons 4 7 5 9 90 82 54 251 
 2.8% 3.4% 3.1% 5.2% 34.5% 35.8% 23.4% 17.9% 
Licensing 3 22 2 8 7 3 0  45 
 2.1% 10.6% 1.3% 4.6% 2.7% 1.3% 0.0% 3.2% 
Housing 19 15 11 4 5 2 9  65 
 13.4% 7.2% 6.9% 2.3% 1.9% 0.9% 3.9% 4.6% 
Social Sec 2 4 3 4 8 1 0  22 
 1.4% 1.9% 1.9% 2.3% 3.1% 0.4% 0.0% 1.6% 
Planning 14 16 10 5 17 10  8  80 
 9.9% 7.7% 6.3% 2.9% 6.5% 4.4% 3.5% 5.7% 
Total 142 208 160 174 261 229 231 1405 
 
Source: Scottish Civil Courts Review, A Consultation Paper (2007) Annex D 
This showed the number of petitions increasing – from an average of 61.4 a year at the outset,   
if we take the first five full years of the procedure as the benchmark, to an average of 200.7 a 
year, with the increase being accounted for by immigration petitions and, in the latter part of 
the period, prison-related petitions. If immigration and prison-related petitions are excluded 
then there is still an increase but it is less marked - from an average of 50.6 a year to an 
average of 86.3 a year. (Tables 4 to 7). 
                                                          
12 Mullen et al (n 5) 135.  
13Scottish Civil Courts Review, A Consultation Paper (2007) Annex D  
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Table 4: Number of judicial review petitions 1986-1990 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Average 
49 44 66 86  62 61.4 
 
Table 5: Number of petitions 1986-90 with immigration and prison petitions excluded  
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Average 
47 44 50 65 47 50.6 
 
Table 6: Number of judicial review petitions 2000-2006 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average 
142 208 160 174 261 229 231 200.7 
 
Table 7: Number of petitions 2000-2006 with immigration and prison petitions excluded 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average 
93 133 87 66 76 73 76 86.3 
 
Aside from the continuing increase in the number of petitions, two other features of this 
snapshot are worth noting. One is the increasing percentage of petitions overall accounted for 
by immigration petitions – from an average of 25.9 per cent over the six years of the second 
academic study to an average of 39.4 per cent a decade later, an increase of the order of 50 
per cent. The Review itself said that the number of immigration petitions had more than 
doubled since 2000, constituting almost half of all judicial reviews in 2006.14  
The other feature is the sudden and dramatic increase in prison-related petitions - from 9 in 
2003 to 90 the following year – aimed, it is assumed, at the practice of ‘slopping out’ in 
Scottish prisons, which was held to amount to degrading treatment contrary to Art 3 ECHR in 
Napier v Scottish Ministers.15 The Review said that from 2004 onwards, prison-related 
petitions also made a substantial contribution to the number of judicial reviews initiated.  
Also noteworthy is the high percentage of miscellaneous petitions – 27.9 per cent of all 
petitions over the period - for which no breakdown was offered.  
Immigration, prisons and miscellaneous petitions aside, planning, housing and licensing 
emerge as the other main sources of petitions but the numbers are small.  
Graph 2 shows the total number of applications and the number of immigration and prison 
applications over the six years, with ‘other’, i.e. non-immigration and prison petitions shown 
separately.  
                                                          
14 Report of the Scottish Civil Courts Review (2009) ch 12, para 4 
15 Napier v Scottish Ministers 2005 1 SC 229 
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Table 8: Judicial Review petitions 2008-09 to 2013-14 
 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2008-09-
2013-14 
Environment 0 0 2 2 1 5 10 
 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.8% 0.3% 1.5% 0.6% 
Housing 2 1 4 1 0 2 10 
 0.9% 0.3% 1.2% 0.4% 0.0% 0.6% 0.6% 
Immigration 177 210 266 195 224 236 1308 
 76.3% 55.6% 77.8% 80.2% 76.5% 71.5% 71.9% 
Licensing 0 1 1 0 1 2 5 
 0.0% 0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 0.3% 0.6% 0.3% 
Planning 5 10 8 11 8 6 48 
 2.2% 2.6% 2.3% 4.5% 2.7% 1.8% 2.6% 
Prisons 18 107 7 3 10 18 163 
 7.8% 28.3% 2.0% 1.2% 3.4% 5.5% 9.0% 
Social Sec 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.1% 
Other  30 49 54 31 48 61 273 
 12.9% 13.0% 15.8% 12.8% 16.4% 18.5% 15.0% 
Total 232 378 342 243 293 330 1818 
 
These show the number of petitions continuing to increase – from an average of 200.7 a year 
over the seven years analysed by the Gill Review to an average of 303 a year, with the 
increase again being accounted for by immigration petitions and by a second surge in prison-
related petitions as a result of the failure to end slopping out in Peterhead Prison. Aside from 
immigration and prisons, however, the use of the procedure has been declining - from an 
average of 86.3 a year over the seven years analysed by the Gill Review to an average of 57.8 
a year once these two areas are excluded, which is not much more than the average of 50.6 a 
year for the first five full years of the new procedure (Tables 7 and 10). The continued 
increase in immigration and prison-related petitions thus appears to have masked a decline in 
the use of judicial review in other contexts, which was already underway when the Gill 
Review reported (Graphs 2 and 3).  
Table 9: Number of judicial review petitions 2008-09 to 2013-14 
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 Average 
232 378 342 243 293 330 303 
 
Table 10: Number of petitions 2008-09 to 2013-14 with immigration and prison petitions 
excluded 
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 Average 
37 61 69 45 59 76 57.8 
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Immigration, prisons and petitions aside, planning emerges as the other main source of 
petitions in recent years. Housing and licensing on the other hand have effectively 
disappeared as subject-matters of judicial review.  
Noteworthy again is the high percentage of applications classified as ‘other’, which it is said 
cannot be broken down further. 
Graph 3 shows the total number of applications and the number of immigration and prison 
applications over the last six years for which figures are available, with ‘other’, i.e. non-
immigration and prison petitions again shown separately.  
 
 
 
       
 
The Civil Law Statistics are silent on the outcome of petitions. A study of judicial review of 
planning decisions between 2003 and 2012, however, confirmed that petitions were more 
often unsuccessful than not. Almost 75% of cases decided by judges were unsuccessful.19  
Overall  
The picture we thus have is of a judicial review caseload that has been steadily increasing 
since the procedure was introduced, with the two main areas of growth having been 
immigration and prisons. Whereas the growth of immigration petitions has been continuous 
throughout the period, with immigration accounting for almost three quarters of all petitions 
in the last six years (an average of 73.1 per cent a year over the last six years, and 71.9 per 
cent of all petitions over the period), the growth in prison petitions has been confined to the 
two surges, with the numbers declining dramatically since the second surge (from 107 in 
2009-10 to seven a year later). Once these two areas are excluded, however, the picture is of a 
                                                          
19 Brodies, ‘Judicial Review of planning decisions in Scotland’ (February 2013). 
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judicial review caseload that has been declining in recent years to levels not much higher than 
those recorded when the procedure was first introduced.   
At the same time the composition of the caseload has been changing. While planning remains 
a small but important source of petitions, housing and licensing petitions have effectively 
disappeared. The high number of “miscellaneous” or “other” applications, however, makes it 
impossible to say in what other respects the composition of the caseload has changed, save 
that devolution has meant that it now includes challenges to Acts of the Scottish Parliament 
as well as administrative acts and omissions.  
England and Wales 
The obvious comparison is with England and Wales, a comparison noted by Mullen, Pick and 
Prosser who calculated that the 1993 figure of 151 petitions represented one petition per 
34,000 inhabitants in Scotland, a figure considerably lower than for England and Wales 
where the 1992 figure was one application per 21,000, a divergence they thought partly 
explicable by the likelihood of London giving rise to homelessness cases and the role of 
Heathrow as the main airport of entry in immigration cases.20  
Table 10: Judicial review applications 2000-2014 
 Civil-
Immigration and 
Asylum 
Civil-other Criminal Total 
2000 2,151 1,727 348 4,238 
2001 2,414 1,956 344 4,722 
2002 3,281 1,812 276 5,372 
2003 3,845 1,810 282 5,938 
2004 2,220 1,666 314 4,200 
2005 3,139 1,926 291 5,356 
2006 4,069 2,037 315 6,422 
2007 4,343 2,030 311 6,684 
2008 4,609 2,137 346 7,093 
2009 6,648 2,102 344 9,098 
2010 8,147 2,034 366 10,547 
2011 8,854 2,141 363 11,360 
2012 9,957 2,091 384 12,432 
2013 13,130 2,191 273 15,594 
2014 1,891 1,903 268 4,062 
 
Source: Ministry of Justice, Judicial and Court Statistics Quarterly: Accompanying Tables 
(March 2015). 
Note: the figures are not directly comparable, those for Scotland being for the financial year 
(1 April to 31 March), while those for England and Wales are for the calendar year.  
                                                          
20 Mullen et al (n 5) 18. 
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The incidence of judicial review in Scotland continues to be lower than in England and 
Wales. If we exclude JR Criminal and JR Civil (Immigration and Asylum) cases and 
concentrate only on JR Civil (Other) and JR Unknown cases, i.e. the second column in Table 
10, then judicial review is running at in the region of 2,100 (2,072) applications a year over 
the last five years. Given that Scotland is roughly one tenth of the size of England (one 
eleventh of the size of England and Wales), we would expect non-immigration judicial 
review applications in Scotland to be running at 210 or so cases a year (195 if we take one 
eleventh as the measure). On the figures for the last six years, however, it is running at 85.3 a 
year, i.e. at roughly 40 per cent of what we would expect on the basis of population size – 
40.6 per cent if we take one tenth as the measure, 43.7 per cent if we take one eleventh as the 
measure.  
As noted above, Mullen, Pick and Prosser offered Heathrow’s status as the main port of entry 
in immigration cases as one explanation for the difference. That may have been the case at 
the time but twenty years later judicial review in Scotland is no less heavily dominated by 
immigration cases than judicial review in England and Wales. In 2012 immigration 
accounted for 82.6 per cent of all judicial reviews in England and Wales. In Scotland the 
figure was 76.5 per cent.  
“[T]he much advertised growth of judicial review in recent times is in large measure a 
function of strict immigration policies, the standards of decision-making in a 
department of state officially characterised as ‘unfit for purpose’, and the evident 
incentive for would-be immigrants to litigate.”21  
Harlow and Rawling’s comment applies as much to Scotland as it applies to England and 
Wales.  
 
Since 2013, the number of applications in England and Wales has dropped dramatically 
following the transfer of the majority of immigration and asylum judicial reviews to the 
Upper Tribunal. There have been no moves to follow suit in Scotland, but were that to 
happen the judicial review caseload of the Court of Session would be substantially reduced.  
What, however, of the decline in judicial review applications? Has there been the same 
decline in non-immigration applications in England and Wales as there has been in Scotland. 
On the evidence of the statistics it would seem not. Judicial review outside the immigration 
field has continued to grow during a time when it has been in decline or else steady in 
Scotland. It is only in the last year that they have recorded their first decline in England and 
Wales since 2004.   
Accounting for the difference 
There is of course no reason why - immigration and asylum aside - the Scottish experience of 
judicial review should be the same as that of England and Wales. A number of reasons, 
however, may be suggested as to why it should be different. One possibility is that there is 
                                                          
21 Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration, 3rd edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009) 713. 
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less need for judicial review in Scotland than in England and Wales. Judicial review after all 
is a remedy of last resort (Rule of Court 260B 3). So long as there are sufficient alternative 
means of challenging the legality of administrative action, it ought not to matter that the 
incidence of judicial review in Scotland is less than in England and Wales. This would be a 
reassuring explanation if true. But we would need to know a great deal more about the 
working of the administrative justice system in Scotland as a whole before we were justified 
in concluding that was the case.  
A second possibility is cultural in nature. In their study of paths to justice in Scotland, Genn 
and Paterson found a significantly lower reported incidence of “justiciable events” in 
Scotland compared with England and Wales, which they suggested may be attributable to a 
more stoical attitude to the vicissitudes of life - the ‘Ach tae hell with it’ syndrome - or to a 
more communitarian spirit in which problems or disputes are more likely to be seen in 
collective rather than individual terms.22 There may well be something in this but it is 
difficult to reconcile with the evidence of the increasing use made of other mechanisms of 
redress in Scotland in recent years. In its first full year of operation (2003-2004), there were 
1,791 complaints and inquiries to the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman. A decade later 
that figure had risen to 4,819, an almost threefold increase. When it comes to government 
there is little to suggest that Scots are any less likely to complain than citizens elsewhere in 
the United Kingdom.   
A third possibility is that it reflects not so much the adequacy or otherwise of the existing 
remedies, or the willingness or readiness of Scots to complain, as the fact that individuals 
including their representatives may not be aware of judicial review or of what it can achieve, 
which in turn raises questions about access to legal advice and services. The Final Report of 
the Administrative Justice Steering Group, emphasised the need to improve the availability of 
appropriate advice and representation at the same time as improving the system of remedies 
for citizens’ grievances.23  
It may also reflect the cost, time and uncertainty involved in judicial review proceedings. 
‘There is a widespread perception that legal proceedings involve uncertainty, expense, and 
potential long-term disturbance and that only the most serious matters could justify enduring 
those conditions.’24 Judicial review may be beyond many petitioners’ means without some 
form of legal aid. It may take a long time to get a decision, particularly if appeals are 
involved. A decade ago it was recorded as  
“a common complaint of administrative lawyers in Scotland that, by the time a point is 
argued in the Outer House, the English are arguing the same point in the Court of 
Appeal. Whilst waiting for a hearing in the Inner House, the English have the point in 
                                                          
22 Hazel Genn and Alan Paterson, Paths to Justice Scotland: What People in Scotland Do and Think About 
Going to Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) 82-84; “the stronger socialist tradition which looks to community 
solutions rather than individual action” was Dame Brenda Hale’s summing up (Foreword p viii)).   
23 Administrative Justice in Scotland – the Way Forward (June 2009) paras 8.74-75, available at: 
http://www.consumerfocus.org.uk/scotland/files/2010/10/Administrative-Justice-in-Scotland-The-Way-
Forward-Full-Report.pdf  
24 Genn and Paterson (n 22) 250 
13 
 
the House of Lords. Much of our administrative law is decided, by default, as it were in 
England.”25  
And there is no certainty of success. Even if a petition is successful, it only results in a 
finding of illegality - the same decision may be taken again, shorn of the illegality.  
Then, finally, there is the question of Scottish judicial attitudes towards the role of the courts 
in the control of government, which arguably have been slower to change, or more resistant 
to change, than judicial attitudes south of the border, with the result that Scots law has lagged 
behind English law in matters such as standing, the reviewability of errors of law within 
jurisdiction and, in an earlier era, recourse to the European Convention of Human Rights in 
the interpretation of statutes.26 The restrictive approach to the question of standing in 
particular is said to have had the effect of discouraging applications and of work being lost to 
London.27  
Concluding remarks  
The critical question, however, is whether this difference matters. The Faculty of Advocates 
in its response to the consultation on the draft Courts Reform (Scotland) Bill certainly 
thought that it did. In its response, the Faculty argued:  
“The position in Scotland is quite different from the position in England and Wales, 
and any perceptions based on the experience in that jurisdiction that there is a large 
volume of judicial review applications, many of them unmeritorious, would be 
unfounded. On one view, the real issue in relation to judicial review in Scotland is the 
low incidence of petitions, particularly outside the immigration and asylum field, as 
compared with the position in comparable jurisdictions. The reasons for this are 
obscure, but it may reflect badly on the rule of law in Scotland and indicate a level of 
unmet legal need.” 
As I have indicated, we would need to know more about how the Scottish administrative 
justice system as a whole was working before we were justified in drawing any firm 
conclusions about unmet legal need or indeed the rule of law in Scotland. The importance of 
judicial review to our understanding of the control of government is such, however, that there 
is a clear need for a fresh examination of judicial review in Scotland as the procedure enters 
its fourth decade.  
                                                          
25 Blair and Martin, ‘Judicial Review 20 Years On – Where Are We Now?’ 2005 SLT (News) 173, 175. 
26 CMG Himsworth, “Judicial Review in Scotland” in Brigid Hadfield (ed), Judicial Review: A Thematic 
Approach (Dublin: Gill &Macmillan, 1995) 305-306; Aileen McHarg, “Border Disputes: The Scope and 
Purposes of Judicial Review” in Aileen McHarg and Tom Mullen (eds), Public Law in Scotland (Edinburgh: 
Avizandum, 2006) 235.  
27 Blair and Martin (n 25) 176 
